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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to test the impact of passive and active ownership
on total shareholder return (TSR) and environmental, social, and governance (ESG) score
of firms. The motivation behind the study is the rise in passive investing over the last few
decades and the concern that passive owners are not able to engage sufficiently with
management of the companies they are invested in.
This study hypothesized that firms that are actively controlled have high TSR and
higher ESG scores than firms that are passively controlled. The hypothesis was supported
by the reasoning that passive owners lack the incentives and resources to monitor their
holdings, and that they cannot use the threat of exit to provoke corporate management to
act in their best interest.
This study finds empirical evidence that passive controlling ownership has a
positive impact on companies’ one-year total shareholder return. Being passively
controlled was found to increase a firm’s one-year TSR by 6.94 percent compared to not
being controlled. No significant relationships between controlling ownership and ESG
score were found.

This thesis is dedicated to Robert A.G. Monks.
Thank you for the insights that inspired my research and your leadership in the field of
corporate governance.
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INTRODUCTION

Background
In 1976, a concept that revolutionized the financial markets was created by John
Bogle, founder of The Vanguard Group. The concept was named the “index fund,”1 a low
cost, passively managed fund that tracks the market and allows investors to profit from its
inevitable long-term success. The index fund emerged from investors’ sentiments of
disappointment in actively managed funds, which were characterized by buying and
selling companies based on their predicted performance. Investors were frustrated,
believing that actively managed funds failed to produce sufficient returns despite their
high fees (Culloton 2011).
Bogle’s first passive fund, the index fund VFINX, was created to follow the U.S.
large cap S&P 500 Index. Today, the Vanguard Group is one of the largest index
investors in the world. Over 5,000 passive funds make up over a third of assets held in
the U.S. financial market, while assets bought and sold by active investment managers
still hold the remaining two thirds (Hunnicutt 2017). The passive funds currently
available track a wide range of investments, including countries, sectors, industries, small
cap stocks, and benchmarks. More funds are created constantly, such as BlackRock’s
recently announced exchange traded funds that exclude gun manufacturing and selling
companies (Kerber 2018). In the last decade, passive funds have seen growth of about
60% as investors flock to them for low fee, low maintenance investing. Moody’s
Investors Service Inc. predicts that passive fund assets will surpass actively managed

1

Because most passively managed funds track indices, the term “index funds” in this study will be used
interchangeably with “passive funds.”
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assets by 2024 (Marriage & Pooley 2017). There is no question that passive index funds
have allowed more people to benefit from equity markets, but we must consider the
potential risks to their growing success.
Motivation
With its recent and projected growth as a percentage of assets held in the U.S., it
is necessary to consider the implications of the rise of the passive fund on financial
markets. One of the primary concerns with passive investing, and the one this study will
address, is whether passive funds are able to adequately engage their ownership
responsibilities with corporate management2 of the companies they are invested in. Index
fund owners such as Fidelity, Vanguard, BlackRock, and State Street Global Advisors
cannot buy or sell index investments based on events that could trigger stock price
changes. These giant index owners do not have the financial leverage that active owners
do. They cannot sell a company’s stock if, for example, its practices become unethical,
board composition puts it at risk, or an unfavorable merger deal is agreed upon. As Rakhi
Kumar, head of stewardship for State Street Global Advisors, writes, “Index investing is
like a marriage where divorce is not an option” (Kapadia 2017). Corporate management
knows that passive owners cannot exit the holding, and this could lead them to make
riskier decisions.
The counter-argument is that passive investors are more inclined to take an active
ownership strategy in the companies they hold because they cannot disinvest, and are

2

“Management” refers to the executive corporate leadership, such as the chief executive officer or chief
operating officer. Active or passive managers, or investors, are institutions that invest and manage money
on behalf of clients, such as BlackRock. “Owners” refers to the individuals or institutions who own the
money that active or passive managers invest. See Appendix A.
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concerned for the long-term performance of their investments. In BlackRock’s annual
letter to CEOs, Larry Fink asks that the companies held by BlackRock’s clients create a
long-term strategy and show how they make “a positive contribution to society” (Fink
2018). Regarding the concern that passive investors are less engaged in the companies
they hold, Fink writes:
In managing our index funds, however, BlackRock cannot express its
disapproval by selling the company’s securities as long as that company
remains in the relevant index. As a result, our responsibility to engage and
vote is more important than ever. In this sense, index investors are the
ultimate long-term investors – providing patient capital for companies to
grow and prosper.
Fink, CEO of the largest asset manager in the world, realizes the challenges
passive investors face, and he asserts that BlackRock engages actively. However, there
has been backlash; active investor Dick Weil published an op-ed in early March of 2018
titled Passive Investors, Don’t Vote, arguing that BlackRock lacks incentive to “cast
informed votes.” This piece, which was published in the Wall Street Journal, went on to
explain that passive investors only engage with the companies they hold to appease the
SEC. Michelle Edkins, head of stewardship BlackRock, responded a few weeks later with
an op-ed titled, All Share Owners Should Vote Their Stocks. She stressed Fink’s point that
BlackRock is a leader in engagement, and that all investors should be active owners.
There are additional concerns that because passive investors hold hundreds of
companies, it is unlikely they have the resources or incentive to monitor them. The lack
of incentive argument stems from the idea that passive investors are only concerned with
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the performance of the larger index, not the individual companies within it. Passive
investors’ lack of financial leverage over the companies they own, and lack of resources
and incentives to monitor corporate management, could become problematic –
particularly when they are a controlling owner in a company (Appel, Gormley, and Keim
2015).

Purpose of study
The purpose of this study is to attempt to answer the question of whether passive
owners engage enough with the companies they hold to ensure proper decision making in
the best interest of shareholders. It tests whether passively controlled companies
underperform or outperform actively controlled companies in total shareholder return
(TSR) and environmental, social, and governance (ESG) score. By considering both
shareholder return and ESG score, my analysis measures shareholder value by weighing
both financial and ESG performance.3

Hypotheses
This paper seeks to empirically test how passive or active controlling ownership
may affect total shareholder return and ESG score of firms by constructing the following
hypotheses:
Hypothesis One
• Alternative Hypothesis: Active controlling ownership increases the total shareholder
return of companies.

3

These are often related. Greater ESG performance has been found to increase financial performance of
companies (Friede, Busch, and Bassen 2015).

4

• Null Hypothesis: Active ownership does not increase the total shareholder return of
companies.
Hypothesis Two
• Alternative Hypothesis: Active controlling ownership increases the ESG score of
companies.
• Null Hypothesis: Active ownership does not increase the ESG score of companies.

Hypothesis Three
• Alternative Hypothesis: Passive controlling ownership decreases the total shareholder
return of companies.
• Null Hypothesis: Passive controlling ownership does not decrease the total shareholder

return of companies.
Hypothesis Four
• Alternative Hypothesis: Passive controlling ownership decreases the ESG score of
companies.
• Null Hypothesis: Passive controlling ownership does not decrease the ESG score of

companies.
The hypotheses derive from the observation that passive managers, compared to
active managers, have less financial leverage, less resources, and potentially less
incentive to monitor their companies (Appel, Gormley, and Keim 2015). Therefore, their
shareholder voice may be limited, and they may not be able to encourage management to
act in the best interest of shareholders as effectively as active owners can.

5

Organization of Paper
The study will move from the introduction and background section to a literature
review of research done on the topic of passive and active ownership and ESG factors’
relationship with company performance. It will discuss how this paper contributes to
existing literature, and then move to an explanation of the model, dataset, and variables.
Next, it will discuss the analysis, results, and interpretation of findings. Finally, the
conclusion will summarize the paper and discuss the implications of the findings, as well
as discuss drawbacks and opportunities for future improvements.

6

LITERATURE REVIEW

Overview of Existing Literature
Although many heated, emotionally driven op-eds have been published on the
effect of passive investing, there has been little academic research done comparing active
and passive ownership impact on total shareholder return or ESG performance of
companies. However, there is literature to support the reasoning behind my hypotheses.
There are many studies on the link between ESG and financial performance, and a paper
by Friede, Busch, and Bassen (2015) aggregates the results of 2,000 studies. Additional
research that will be discussed in the literature review includes investor use of the threat
of exit as a method of engagement, whether institutional investors prefer choosing shortterm returns or long-term strategies, the success of short-term versus long-term strategies,
and what factors drive stock prices.
The first study to address the relationship between passive ownership and
corporate governance, which is a component of ESG, was titled Passive Investors, Not
Passive Owners. Authors Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2015) acknowledged the extensive
research done on the institutional investor impact on corporate governance, but recognize
the lack of studies on specifically passive institutions. They state that their study
contributes to the research “by focusing on passive institutions—a previously ignored,
but increasingly important, set of institutional investors” (Appel, Gormley, and Keim
2015).

7

Impact of Passive and Active Ownership
In their paper Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners, Appel, Gormley, and Keim
(2015) write that there is “surprisingly little analysis of passive institutions like
Vanguard, State Street, and DFA,” which they say represent an increasingly large part of
the U.S. stock market. They assume that the reason for the lack of study is the general
presumption that passive firms do not have the motive or resources to invest in improving
the governance of the hundreds of companies that they hold.
The purpose of the research done by Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2015) was to
identify if passive investors purposefully engage with firm governance to improve
performance. The study began with the suspicion that, “the growth of passive investors
weakens the governance of firms.” This hypothesis was built on the reasoning that: 1) the
incentive for passive investors to influence management is small because, unlike active
investors, they simply follow a benchmark’s performance; 2) passive investors lack the
lever of power over management that active investors have – the ability to sell their
position in the company if management does act in their best interest; and 3) because they
are invested in so many companies, passive investors likely lack the resources to
influence the governance of individual companies.
The analysis found that the growth of passive funds seems to, “on average, have a
positive impact on long-term firm-level performance and value.” The authors came to
this conclusion through finding that passive ownership is associated with key indicators
of a governance-healthy company: more independent directors, more removals of tactics
to prevent hostile takeovers (called “poison pills,”), more shareholder freedom to call
meetings, and less instances of dual class share structures.

8

Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2015) hypothesized that, contrary to their initial
suspicions, passive investors have the incentive to be involved in the governance of the
companies they hold because they cannot sell their positions. This is the same argument
provided by BlackRock CEO, Larry Fink, in his 2018 letter to CEOs.
This study differs from my analysis because it examines specific governance
issues, and does not address the relationship between passive ownership and overall ESG
performance or shareholder return.

The Relationship Between ESG and Firm Performance
Friede, Busch, and Bassen (2015) suggest that interest in the relationship between
financial performance and ESG began in the 1970s, and that more than 2000 studies on
the issue have been published since then. Roughly 90 percent of studies find a positive
relationship between ESG and financial performance. This study is the most complete
collection of academic research on ESG and financial performance, and therefore “allows
for generalizable statements” (Friede, Busch, and Bassen 2015).
Although total shareholder return is not the same as the performance of a
company, it is often positively correlated with performance. Like the results reported by
Friede, Busch, and Bassen (2015), I expect to find in my analysis that ESG score is
positively related to TSR.
The Threat of Exit
Research by Bharath, Jayaraman, and Nagar (2013) examines the effect of the
threat of exit, which is a tool investors use to leverage their desired change in the firm, on
stock price. The effects of threat of exit is difficult to measure, as it is not as quantifiable.

9

Bharath, Jayaraman, and Nagar (2013) work around this by using the principle that the
threat of exit is weaker when stock liquidity is lower and stronger when it is higher. They
shocked liquidity using natural financial crises, and found that firms with large
shareholders (referred to as “blockholders” in the study) suffered greater declines in value
during crisis periods.
Because of this evidence that firms with large shareholders are more sensitive to
the threat of exit, Bharath, Jayaraman, and Nagar’s (2013) study informs my research on
controlling shareholders. My hypothesis states that controlling passive shareholders
create less firm value than large active shareholders in part due to the threat of exit.
Bharath, Jayaraman, and Nagar (2013) do not differentiate between passive and active
owners, but it is active owners that support their conclusion that firms with large
shareholders are more sensitive to the threat of exit.
Passive investors cannot use the threat of exit as a form of engagement.
Therefore, passive controlling shareholders’ inability to use this form of voice prevents
them from having access to the full engagement toolbox that active investors do.
Short-Term Earnings Over Long-Run Value?
Advocates for good corporate governance and ESG impact often complain that
investors favor short-term gain, which they believe sacrifices attention to issues like
board composition and environmental impact. A study by Brian Bushee (2010) seeks to
answer the question of whether institutional investors prefer short-term earnings over
long-run value. Bushee’s work found that institutions with short investment horizon
overweight short-term earnings expectations. With short-term focused investors

10

pressuring firms to perform in the short-run, it may become difficult for companies to
adopt a long-term view.
Barton, et al. (2017) examined the impact of companies adopting a long-term
view on performance. The researchers found that companies focused on the long-term
had significantly stronger financial performance and fundamentals, as well as social
returns that “were equally impressive,” according to Bower and Paine (2017).
Active owners may be either short-term or long-term investors, but by their very
nature, all passive investors are long-term investors because they cannot disinvest. If
passive owners do engage with the companies they invest in, they likely advocate for best
long-term practices to align with their time horizon. Long-term strategies are found to
increase financial and social performance, which could indicate that – if they are
engaging – passive ownership could be associated with greater TSR and ESG score.
However, because my analysis uses one-year TSR, it could be picking up on short-term
only performance.

Factors that drive stock price
Total shareholder return (TSR) measures the return on an equity investment from
changes in stock price plus dividends. TSR is used, along with ESG, in my study as a
measure of a publicly held company’s performance. In addition to ownership type, there
are many forces that influence stock price and therefore TSR. Not all factors were
captured in my study.
The stock price of a company changes when investors buy or sell it. It reflects
investor sentiment. It is often difficult to determine what factors are influencing investor
sentiment, at a given point in time, which is why speculative traders frequently lose
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money in the stock market. Economic factors, investor sentiment, industry performance,
and company performance can all affect stock price, but the level at which they do so
varies over time, across countries, and between companies.
A study by Sharif, Purohit, and Pillai (2015) found that firm specific factors such
as return on equity, book value per share, earnings per share, dividend per share, dividend
yield, price earnings, and debt to assets drive stock price in the Bahrain Stock market.
However, there are external forces that also contribute to prices. Peiró (2016) found that
throughout recent decades, industrial production and long-term interest rates have caused
over half of stock price movement in France, Germany and the United Kingdom, but the
weight of influence has changed from interest rates to production.
Qin and Singal’s (2015) study, Indexing and Stock Price Efficiency, directly
examines the relationship between passive investing and stock price efficiency. Using a
large sample of U.S. stocks, they found that companies that were more indexed had less
stock price efficiency. This study also found evidence that indexing creates the negative
externality of stock price inefficiency. The researchers make this conclusion through
finding that stock prices vary more after earnings announcements and increasingly
deviate from the random walk. They hypothesize that the reason for price inefficiency is
greater opportunity for arbitrage; increased indexing makes informed and reactive trading
on the market more lucrative.
DeLisle, French, and Schutte (2017) further find a negative relation between
passive ownership and the ability to predict earnings, which they use as a proxy for
investor knowledge. Index investing does not react to earnings or market changes, and its
rise provides greater opportunity for active traders to profit as their market influence

12

increases relatively. Stock price inefficiency reduces total shareholder return; therefore,
Qin and Singal (2015) provide evidence for my hypothesis that passive investing creates
lower total shareholder return.

Contributions to Literature
My analysis will contribute to research conducted on the impact of passive
ownership by addressing, for the first time, the effect of passive ownership on TSR and
ESG performance. The analysis of Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2015), Passive Investors,
Not Passive Owners, focused on governance specific issues, and it provided useful
background for the reasoning of my hypotheses. My study provides a broader
examination of the effects of passive ownership than Appel, Gormley, and Keim’s (2015)
by adding environmental and social considerations, and examining its effect on total
shareholder return.
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CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND DATA

Model and Expected Results
The purpose of the analysis is to examine the effect of ownership type on total
shareholder return (TSR) and the environmental, social, and governance (ESG) score of
publicly-traded companies. The ownership types considered are active controlled, passive
controlled, and not controlled. Because every company is categorized into one of these
ownership classes, the regression analysis requires that one of the categories is omitted
from the model. The omitted category is “not controlled.” When interpreting the results,
the estimated coefficients corresponding to the variables of active and passive controlled
are, therefore, interpreted relative to the omitted category “not controlled.”
We expect to find that actively controlled companies have higher TSR and ESG
score relative to companies that are not controlled. Therefore, we expected that the
Active Controlled variable would have a positive and statistically significant effect in
both models. We also expected to find that being passively controlled has a negative
effect on TSR and ESG score relative to the omitted category, “not controlled.” Two
linear regressions were run, one with One Year TSR as the dependent variable and the
other with ESG Score as the dependent variable.
𝑂𝑛𝑒 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑇𝑆𝑅
= 𝛽- + 𝛽/ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽9 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽< 𝐸𝑆𝐺 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒
+ 𝛽? 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝 + 𝛽E 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽J 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠
+ 𝛽L 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦 + 𝛽P 𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽R 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠
+ 𝛽/- 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽// 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽/9 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 + 𝛽/< 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦
+ 𝛽/? 𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽/E 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠
+ 𝛽/J 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽/L 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑦 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 + 𝑢T
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𝐸𝑆𝐺 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝛼- + 𝛼/ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 + 𝛼9 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑
+ 𝛼< 𝑂𝑛𝑒 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑇𝑆𝑅 + 𝛼? 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝
+ 𝛼E 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 + 𝛼J 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠
+ 𝛼L 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦 + 𝛼P 𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝛼R 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠
+ 𝛼/- 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒 + 𝛼// 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛼/9 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 + 𝛼/< 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦
+ 𝛼/? 𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝛼/E 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠
+ 𝛼/J 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 + 𝛼/L 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑦 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 + 𝑢T
Data and Variables
The dataset used in the analysis was obtained from MSCI ESG Research, a
wholly owned subsidiary of MSCI, Inc. MSCI is a global investment research firm that
provides indices and research, including governance and risk data, primarily to
institutional investors. The data set contains information on 2,189 companies across the
eleven Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) sectors. The GICS system was
developed in 1999 by MSCI and S&P Global. The dataset contains ESG, governance, and
controversy score variables created by MSCI’s research teams. All data was gathered or
updated in 2017.
The data was cleaned and organized in Microsoft Excel. Much of the data was
converted from text to numerical values so that it could be analyzed. For example, sectors
were listed as text under one column. I separated each sector into individual columns and
set them as dummy variables. ESG scores were converted from letters A through E to
numbers 0 through 5. Additionally, outliers and missing values were identified and
removed. Regressions were run using Stata, a statistical software used primarily by
economists.
The following table contains the description, number of observations, mean,
standard deviation, and range of all variables used in the two models:
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Table 1: Variables
Variable Name
Dependent Variables
One-Year TSR
ESG Score

Description

Observations

Total shareholder return over 2017.
Environmental, social, and governance
score of company, given by MSCI.

Mean

Standard Deviation

Range

2,318

18.209

45.079

-87.5 - 437.7

2,317

1.633

0.931

0- 5

2,318

0.045

0.208

0- 1

2,318

0.135

0.342

0- 1

2,318

0.818

0.386

0- 1

2,318

0.147

0.354

0- 1

2,318

0.167

0.373

0- 1

2,318

0.149

0.356

0- 1

2,318

0.031

0.175

0- 1

2,318

0.140

0.347

0- 1

2,318

0.138

0.345

0- 1

2,318

0.074

0.261

0- 1

2,318

0.050

0.218

0- 1

2,318

0.050

0.218

0- 1

2,318

0.011

0.103

0- 1

2,318

0.042

0.201

0- 1

2,318

0.109

0.312

0- 1

2,317

5.032

1.430

0 - 8.9

2,318

8.038

2.791

0 - 10

2,317

9.485

0.631

7.802 - 11.904

Independent Variables
Ownership Type
Active Controlled
Passive Controlled
Not Controlled*

If company is owned over 30% by an
active manager.
If company is owned over 30% by an
passive manager.
If company is not held 30% or more by one
shareholder.

Sectors
Consumer Discretionary
Financials
Information Technology
Utilities
Industrials
Health Care
Real Estate
Materials
Energy
Telecommunications
Consumer Staples*

Firms that produce non-essential
consumer goods and services.
Firms that provide financial services to
commercial and retail customers.
Firms that create applications, operating
systems and computer components.
Firms such as electric, gas and water firms,
and integrated providers.
Firms that manufacture machinery, handheld tools and industrial products.
Firms that provide medical services,
manufacture equipment or drugs, or
provide medical insurance.
Typically REITs of residential, commercial,
and industrial real estate.
Firms that discover, develop, and process
raw materials.
Firms involved in producing or supplying
energy.
Global communication firms, including
internet providers.
Firms that produce essential consumer
goods and services.

Other
Multiple Share Classes
Governance Score
Controversy Score
Log Market Cap

If a firm issues multiple classes of voting
shares.
Governance score of company on a 1-10
scale, given by MSCI
Controversy score of company on a 1-10
scale, given by MSCI
The logarithmic transformation of market
capitalization of company.

Table 1: A descriptive table of variables used in the analysis. *Starred variables were omitted from the
regressions.

Dependent Variables
Total Shareholder Return (TSR). One-year TSR is the other dependent variable in
this study. The dataset contains TSR variables for returns over one-year, three-year, and
five-year returns. TSR is expressed as a percentage, “measures the gain in a company’s
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share price over time, plus any dividends paid, and assuming that those dividends were
reinvested” (MSCI ESG Research 2017). It reflects the market’s valuation of the
company’s performance. It is usually used as a “long term indicator of the comparative
success the company has achieved by creating value for its shareholders in the
competitive market” (Shah and Sengupta n.d.).
In the analysis, one-year TSR variable was used due to excessive missing values
in the three and four-year variables. The 47 companies with missing one-year TSR values
were removed from the dataset. There were four values that held one-year TSR equal to
0, and these were left in the dataset.

Figure 1: A histogram of total shareholder return percentages.

Figure 1 shows the distribution of one-year TSR vales for 2,189 companies. The
histogram shows that the one-year TSR values are skewed to the right, and the skew
statistic is 38.286. 99.957 percent of the observations are in the first bin. The spread is
from -87.500 percent to 5,309.080 percent, and the center is 20.491 percent. To identify
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companies that are outliers in terms of one-year TSR, I looked for values that are more
than three times the magnitude of the interquartile range (i.e. the difference between the
third and first quartile) above the third quartile. The maximum value of 5,309 percent is
44.544 standard deviations above the mean, and this observation was removed from the
dataset due to suspicion that it was miscoded. Although another 104 companies were
found to be outliers above the upper bound and 25 companies were outliers below the
lower bound, these values were left in the data because they appear to be correctly
measured data points.

Figure 2: A histogram of total shareholder return without outlier of 5,309.080 percent.

Figure 2 shows the distribution of one-year TSR after the outlier with a value of
5,309.080 percent, is removed. The distribution is still skewed to the right, but the skew
statistic is 2.901, which is substantially lower than the original value. The spread is from 87.500 percent to 437.700 percent, and the center is 18.210 percent.
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Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) Score. The ESG score, another
product of MSCI, is one of the two dependent variables used in this study. The variable is
measured on a scale of 0-5, with the scores falling on integers. ESG stands for
environmental, social, and governance, and is a popular term to describe how well a
company is performing in these areas. Environmental concerns include carbon emissions
or waste disposal, social issues include worker pay and diversity, and governance is the
system by which companies are directed by the board. Governance reflects the
relationship between management and owners, with a good governance system reflecting
the rights and wishes of owners and holding management accountable.
To create the score, MSCI ESG Research collects public data such as government
and NGO datasets and company disclosure documents, and the ESG corporate
communications team engages with companies to verify data. MSCI then weights certain
ESG issues – called the Weighted Average Key Issue Score – relative to industry peers
to create the final rating (MSCI ESG Research n.d.).

Figure 3: A histogram of the ESG score variable.
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Figure 3 shows the distribution of ESG scores in the data. The data is most
heavily concentrated on a 2 ESG score, with 1,282 companies falling into this score. The
distribution skews to the right with a skew statistic of 1.156.
Independent Variables
Ownership type. The three independent variables of primary interest are Active
Controlled, Passive Controlled, and Not Controlled. They are each dummy variables,
with a value of 1 if true and 0 if not true. Actively controlled companies are defined as
those whose largest shareholder owns 30 percent or more of the firm and are founder or
family owned, or not owned by BlackRock, Fidelity, Vanguard, or State Street. Passively
controlled companies are defined as those whose largest shareholder owns 30 percent or
more of the firm, and that shareholder is either BlackRock, Fidelity, Vanguard, or State
Street. This classification was determined by the reality that, “Vanguard, BlackRock, and
State Street together control three-quarters of all the money in passive funds” (Kapadia
2017). It is not a precisely accurate classification, but it is close enough for the purposes
of this analysis.
“Not controlled” companies are defined as not being held at 30 percent or more
by a single shareholder. The majority of companies, 1,896, are not controlled, 104 are
passively controlled, and 315 are actively controlled.
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Figure 4: The number of companies within each type of controlling ownership.

Out of the 104 passively controlled companies, 44 percent are in the Real Estate
sector. A study by Sebastian Mercado (2015), Chief Strategist at Deutsche Bank, also
found that real estate was the largest passively owned sector in 2014. A concern is that
real estate investment trusts (REITs), a large part of the Real Estate sector, are unique in
their legal requirements for ownership structure. It is required by law that, “five or fewer
individuals cannot own more than 50 percent of the value of the REIT's stock during the
last half of its taxable year” (Nareit n.d.). Therefore, it is a concern that a large proportion
of the 46 passively controlled Real Estate companies are REITs.
Among the 315 actively controlled companies, 26 percent are in the Consumer
Discretionary sector. Figure 5 shows the number of passively and actively controlled
companies across all sectors:
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Figure 5: The number of actively and passively controlled companies by sector.

Log of Market Capitalization. Market capitalization is the total dollar value of a
company's shares outstanding. Companies with small market capitalizations usually have
a more volatile stock price than companies with large market capitalizations. They may
see much higher or lower one-year TSR. Additionally, governance practices have been
found to be worse on average at small-capitalization firms (Rutherford & Martin 2013).
This may be reflected in the model that includes market capitalization’s impact on ESG
score.
Because there were a few high outliers that skewed the data, the log of market
capitalization was generated and used in place of the raw values. It is a common
transformation of the market capitalization variable, and this approach was taken by
Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2015).
Figure 6 shows the distribution of the raw market capitalization of all companies:
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Figure 6: Distribution of raw market cap variable.

The shape of the raw market capitalization histogram is skewed heavily right,
with a skew statistic of 10.200. 97.280 percent of the data is in the first bin. The spread is
from $.634 billion to $802.160 billion, and the center is $11.886 billion.
The following figure is a distribution of market capitalization of the companies
after the log transformation:

Figure 7: Distribution of log transformation of market cap variable.
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The shape of the log-transformed market cap distribution is normal with a slight
skew to the right. The skew statistic is .672, the spread is from 7.802 to 11.904, and the
center is 9.485.
GICS Sectors. The eleven Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) sectors
- Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Energy, Financials, Health Care,
Industrials, Information Technology, Materials, Real Estate, Telecommunication
Services, and Utilities - were each dummy variables. Sectors were included as variables
to attempt to identify sector trends in one-year TSR and ESG performance. The excluded
sector was consumer staples, which accounts for 4.38 percent of the sample, making it
one of the smaller sectors considered.
The Consumer Discretionary sector contains firms that produce non-essential
consumer goods and services; the Financials sector includes commercial and retail
customer financial services; the Information Technology sector contains companies that
create applications, operating systems, and other computer related mechanisms; the
Utilities sector includes gas and power utilities; the Industrials sector includes machinery
and industrial tool manufacturing firms; the Health Care sector contains firms that
provide medical goods and services; the Real Estate sector typically contain REITs of
residential, commercial, and industrial real estate; the Materials sector discovers,
develops, and processes raw materials; Energy sector companies produce or supply
energy; firms in the Telecommunications sector provide global communication; the
Consumer Staples sector produces essential consumer goods and services (Fidelity
Investments n.d.).
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There are a few unique features to note about the Real Estate sector. It was
recently added to the GICS in 2016. It is largely comprised of real estate investment
trusts (REITs), which do not behave like typical equities. Their earnings are usually tied
to long-term contracts, they have to pay at least 90 percent of their income in dividends,
and they are legally prevented from having five or fewer individuals own more than 50
percent of the REIT.
The Health Care sector had the highest average one-year TSR, and the Energy
sector had the lowest.

Figure 8: Average one-year TSR by sector.

The sector average ESG scores were similar, but Real Estate and Health Care had
the highest average scores and Telecommunications Services had the lowest:
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Figure 9: Average ESG score by sector.

Sectors varied widely in market capitalization. The three sectors with the largest
average market capitalization are Telecommunication Services, Consumer Staples, and
Information Technology with market capitalizations between $17 and $23 billion. The
sectors with the lowest average market cap are Real Estate and Materials, with market
capitalizations around $6 billion.

Figure 10: Average market capitalization by sector.
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Multiple Classes of Voting Stock. Companies with multiple classes of voting
stock have long been a concern among investors. Dual-class shares made their first
appearances in the 1980s, and today are worth more than $5 trillion in the capital
markets. This system contains two or more types of shares, one with full voting rights
and usually held by insiders, and the other(s) with limited voting rights typically owned
by public shareholders. The dual-class system has been adopted in situations in which
management wants to retain ownership control, and SEC commissioner Robert J.
Jackson, Jr. writes, “you have a structure that undermines accountability: management
can outvote ordinary investors on virtually anything” (Jackson 2018).
There are 244 companies with multiple classes of shares and 1,945 without.
Governance Score. Governance score is an MSCI ESG Research rating on a scale
between 0-10, with the score increasing as governance quality increases. Governance
represents the “G” in ESG, and therefore we expected to find correlation between the
ESG Score and the Governance Score. The correlation was .133, and the variance
inflation factor (VIF) was 1.018. Therefore, we determined there was not
multicollinearity between the two variables. The standard rule is that a VIF of greater
than 4 or greater should be investigated, and a VIF exceeding 10 indicates
multicollinearity (The Pennsylvania State University n.d.).
Governance score is calculated by combining eleven measures, and incorporates
factors such as executive compensation, board composition, number of independent
directors, board diversity, and voting rights.
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Figure 11: Distribution of Governance Score variable.

Figure 11 shows the distribution of governance scores. Scores are most highly
concentrated between 5.340 and 6.230, and the distribution is slightly skewed to the left
with a skew statistic of -0.489.
Controversy Score. The MSCI ESG controversy score provides a company rating,
on a scale of 0-10 with 0 being the most severe controversy, of controversies concerning
the “negative environmental, social, and/or governance impact of company operations,
products and services.” This framework is consistent with international standards created
by the UN Declaration of Human Rights, the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles
and Rights at Work, and the UN Global Compact (MSCI ESG Research 2017).
The controversy score was included because it was considered to be a factor that
influences ESG score and TSR. It considers issues that affect stakeholders such as the
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environment, customers, and the community. Controversies in these areas are can affect
stock price and/or ESG performance.
We expected that there was correlation between the ESG Score and the
Controversy Score. We found that the correlation was negative, and the variance inflation
factor (VIF) was 1.005. Therefore, we determined there was not multicollinearity
between the two variables.
Figure 12 shows the distribution of controversy score of companies, with the data
most heavily concentrated on 10, the least severe controversy score. The skew is -1.166,
and only 95 companies labeled as having the most severe controversy(ies).

Figure 12: Distribution of Controversy Score variable.
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ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Empirical Results and Key Findings
Before running regressions, a scatterplot was created to attempt to identify
standout relationships between one-year TSR and ESG score by ownership type. The
scatterplot shows a positive relationship of .04 between one-year TSR and ESG score
among passively controlled companies.

Figure 13: ESG score contributing to TSR where red is actively controlled and blue is passively controlled.

In the first model, the regressions found that passive controlling ownership was
statistically significant and positively influences one-year TSR. However, active
controlling ownership was not statistically significant. Therefore, we fail to reject the null
Hypothesis One that active controlling ownership does not have a positive impact on oneyear TSR. Additionally, we cannot reject the null Hypothesis Three that passive
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ownership has a non-negative impact on one-year TSR. We fail to reject it because the
Passive Controlled variable was significant and found to positively impact One Year
TSR.
In the second model with dependent variable ESG Score, neither active or passive
controlling ownership were statistically significant. Therefore, we fail to reject the null
Hypothesis Two that active controlling ownership does not have a positive impact on
ESG score. We also cannot reject the null Hypothesis Four that passive controlling
ownership has a non-negative impact on ESG score.
Hypothesis One
Hypothesis One set out to test whether active controlling ownership increases a
firm’s total shareholder return. Using a significance level of .05, the statistically
significant variables were Passive Controlled, ESG Score, Governance Score, Log
Market Cap, Consumer Discretionary, Utilities, Industrials, Health Care, Materials, and
Energy because their p-values were less than .05.
Passive Controlled had a coefficient of 6.939, which indicates that for every oneunit increase in active ownership, a 6.939 percent increase is predicted in one-year TSR,
holding all other variables constant. A one-unit increase in ESG Score is predicted to
increase one-year TSR by 1.924 percent, while a unit increase in Governance Score is
predicted to decrease one-year TSR by 1.305 percent. A unit increase in Log Market Cap
is predicted to increase One Year TSR by 14.255 percent.
Companies in the energy sector have, on average, a negative relationship with
one-year TSR. However, companies in the consumer discretionary, industrials, utilities,
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materials, and health care sectors on average correspond with a predicted increase in One
Year TSR.
With a raw R-squared value of .099, the variance in the independent variables
predicts 9.9 percent of the variation in the dependent. This is an overall measure of the
model’s fit.

Table 2: Regression Analysis 1
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

466,535.298
4,241,502.570

17.000
2,298.000

Total

4,708,037.870

2,315.000

One-Year TSR
Active Controlled
Passive Controlled
ESG Score
Governance Score
Controversy Score
Multiple Share Classes
Log Market Cap
Consumer Discretionary
Financials
Utilities
Information Technology
Industrials
Health Care
Real Estate
Materials
Energy
Telecommunications
Constant

Coefficient
-7.054
6.939
1.924
-1.305
0.371
-0.581
14.255
13.010
8.204
22.179
7.040
18.423
30.896
3.877
20.170
-13.991
14.730
-131.535

Number of obs
F(17, 2298)
27,443.253 Prob > F
1,845.737 R-squared
Adj R-squared
2,033.710 Root MSE

Standard Error t
4.561
3.076
0.974
0.633
0.323
3.348
1.441
4.954
4.917
4.964
6.689
5.008
5.037
5.578
5.948
5.960
9.665
15.446

P > |t|
-1.550
2.260
1.980
-2.060
1.150
-0.170
9.890
2.630
1.670
4.470
1.050
3.680
6.130
0.700
3.390
-2.350
1.520
-8.520

2,316.000
14.870
0.099
0.092
42.962

[95% Confidence Interval]
0.122
0.024
0.048
0.039
0.251
0.862
0.000
0.009
0.095
0.000
0.293
0.000
0.000
0.487
0.001
0.019
0.128
0.000

-15.998
0.907
0.014
-2.547
-0.262
-7.147
11.429
3.295
-1.439
12.445
-6.077
8.601
21.019
-7.061
8.506
-25.680
-4.223
-161.825

1.891
12.971
3.833
-0.063
1.004
5.985
17.080
22.725
17.847
31.914
20.156
28.244
40.773
14.815
31.834
-2.303
33.682
-101.246

Table 2: Regression table of model one (One-Year TSR).

Hypothesis Two
Hypothesis Two set out to test whether active controlling ownership increases a
firm’s ESG Score. Using a significance level of .05, the statistically significant variables
were Governance Score, Controversy Score, Materials, and Telecommunications.
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A unit increase in governance score is predicted to increase ESG score by .095
units, and a unit increase in controversy score is predicted to decrease ESG Score by
.023. Both Materials and Telecommunications are negatively related to the dependent
variable, with a unit increase in Materials predicting a .277 score decrease in ESG Score
and a unit increase in Telecommunications predicting a .415 score decrease in ESG
Score.
The raw R-squared value is .032, indicating that the variance in the independent
variables predicts 3.2 percent of the variance in the dependent variable. The model has
not done well to identify variables that impact ESG Score.
Table 3: Regression Analysis 2
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

64.752
1,943.288

17.000
2,298.000

Total

2,008.040

2,315.000

ESG Score
Active Controlled
Passive Controlled
One-Year TSR
Governance Score
Controversy Score
Multiple Share Classes
Log Market Cap
Consumer Discretionary
Financials
Utilities
Information Technology
Industrials
Health Care
Real Estate
Materials
Energy
Telecommunications
Constant

Coefficient Standard Error
-0.049
-0.027
0.001
0.095
-0.023
0.024
-0.038
-0.065
-0.151
-0.039
0.009
-0.076
-0.138
-0.047
-0.277
-0.199
-0.415
1.793

Number of obs
F(17, 2298)
3.809 Prob > F
0.846 R-squared
Adj R-squared
0.867 Root MSE

t

0.098
0.066
0.000
0.013
0.007
0.072
0.031
0.106
0.105
0.107
0.143
0.108
0.109
0.119
0.127
0.128
0.207
0.334

P > |t|
-0.500
-0.420
1.980
7.080
-3.400
0.330
-1.210
-0.610
-1.430
-0.360
0.070
-0.710
-1.270
-0.390
-2.180
-1.560
-2.010
5.370

2,316.000
4.500
0.032
0.025
0.920
[95% Confidence Interval]

0.619
0.678
0.048
0.000
0.001
0.743
0.227
0.539
0.151
0.717
0.948
0.480
0.203
0.695
0.030
0.118
0.045
0.000

Table 3: Regression table of model two (ESG Score).
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-0.240
-0.157
0.000
0.069
-0.037
-0.117
-0.100
-0.274
-0.357
-0.248
-0.271
-0.287
-0.352
-0.281
-0.527
-0.450
-0.821
1.139

0.143
0.102
0.002
0.121
-0.010
0.164
0.024
0.143
0.055
0.171
0.290
0.135
0.075
0.187
-0.027
0.051
-0.010
2.448

Hypotheses Three and Four
Hypotheses Three and Four were created to test the impact of passive ownership
on one-year TSR and ESG Score. Null Hypothesis Three was that passive ownership
does not negatively impact on One-Year TSR, and null Hypothesis Four was that passive
ownership does not negatively impact ESG Score. We failed to reject the null Hypothesis
Three because we found empirical evidence that passive ownership positively impacts
One Year TSR, and we failed to reject the null Hypothesis Four because the results were
not statistically significant.
Interpretation
The first hypothesis predicted that active ownership increases total shareholder
return of firms, but the results showed that, contrarily, being passively controlled
increases one-year TSR on average. No definitive conclusion could be made about active
ownership because the results were not significant.
The second hypothesis predicted that active controlling ownership increases firm
ESG Score. The analysis did not find significant evidence that either type of ownership
influences a firm’s ESG performance.

Limitations of the Models
The biggest limitation in this study was using one-year total shareholder return
instead of a longer-term measurement, such as five-year TSR. This was done due to the
quantity of missing values in five-year and three-year TSR data.4 Two possible reasons

516 data points were missing in five-year TSR. However, these missing data appeared to be missing at
random. A regression was run to test the impact of active or passive ownership on five-year TSR. The
active and passive ownership variables were not found to be significant.
4
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for missing data are that the company had an initial public offering less than three years
prior to the date the data was collected, or that is new in its trading form due to merger
and acquisition action.
A disadvantage of using one-year TSR is that it is sensitive to market conditions
over the year it was measured. 2017 saw the continuation of an unusual bull market that
began soon after the financial crisis of 2008, and has been the second-longest bull market
to ever run (Moreano 2016). This will not allow for an analysis of the impact of
ownership type on TSR that considers all conditions of the market. Additionally, using a
one-year TSR measure conflicts with the long-term nature of index investors; their
engagement goals are long-term and thus will likely not be reflected with a one-year TSR
measure. This problem may have been alleviated by comparing two one-year TSR
measures from two points in time, one during a bull market and one during a bear market,
such as 2007.
An additional limitation was not including more factors that influence company
performance, and therefore stock price, in the model as variables. These variables include
ratios such as return on assets, sales to equity, net income, and others that reflect
performance and impact value (Peiró 2016).
In the second model, a concern was that Governance Score and Controversy
Score would explain much of the variance in the dependent variable and drown out the
effects of other variables. However, a regression was run without these two independent
variables, and similar results were found in both the R-squared value and the significance
of other variables in the model.
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Finally, ESG Score was used as an independent variable in the first model, and
One Year TSR was used as an independent variable in the second model. This may have
caused correlation in error terms.
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CONCLUSION

Summary of Paper
My analysis sought to determine whether companies with passive controlling
ownership underperform or outperform firms with active controlling ownership in
shareholder value. Based on three reasons, I hypothesized that firms with passive
controlling ownership had lower total shareholder return and worse ESG score. The three
reasons were that passive owners have less incentive to monitor their holdings, that they
do not have the resources to do so, and that they cannot use the threat of exit to provoke
management to act in the best interest of shareholders.
This thesis finds empirical evidence that passive investing has a positive impact
on companies’ one-year total shareholder return. No significant relationships between
controlling ownership and ESG score were found.
Being passively controlled was found to increase a firm’s One Year TSR by 6.94
percent compared to not being controlled. This relationship may be a result of
engagement, as hypothesized, but perhaps more likely it is a result of inflows of investor
funds into passively managed holdings over actively managed holdings in 2017, as
“passive funds were heavily favored over active” (Vlastelica 2017). TSR reflects stock
price, and prices rises when investor money flows into the company.

Discussion and Further Research
Although this study found empirical evidence that passive controlling ownership
positively influenced one-year TSR, there were many limitations in this analysis that
could be amended in further studies. One limitation was using only a one-year TSR
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measure, which fails to provide a long-term performance measure of companies held by
passive, or long-term, investors. This could be improved by using one-year TSR
measures from two different years over a period of time to account for different market
conditions as well as long-term ownership effects. Another limitation is using only
controlling owners to determine ownership type. Ideally, we would have used data on all
owners of the firms to aggregate ownership type and provide a more nuanced measure of
whether they are passively or actively owned. This would have given us a much larger
number of passively and actively held companies.
Further research should be done on the implications of rising passive ownership
of stocks, and whether engagement by passive owners is adequate to hold corporate
management accountable to shareholders.

38

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Appel, I., Gormley, T., & Keim, D. (2016). Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners.
Journal of Financial Economics, 121(1), 111–141.
Barton, D., Manyika, J., Koller, T., Palter, R., Godsall, J., & Zoffer, J. (2017). Measuring
the Economic Impact of Short-Termism. McKinsey Global Institute. Retrieved from
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Global%20Themes/Long%20term%
20Capitalism/Where%20companies%20with%20a%20long%20term%20view%20o
utperform%20their%20peers/MGI-Measuring-the-economic-impact-of-shorttermism.ashx
Bharath, S., Jayaraman, S., & Nagar, V. (2010). Exit as Governance: An Empirical
Analysis. Journal of Finance, Forthcoming.
Bushee, B. (2010). Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near-Term Earnings over Long-Run
Value? Contemporary Accounting Research.
Culloton, D. (2011, August). A Brief History of Indexing. Fund Spy. Retrieved from
http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=390749
DeLisle, R. J., French, D., & Schutte, M. (2017). Passive Institutional Ownership, R2
Trends, and Price Informativeness. The Financial Review, 52(4), 627–659.
Fidelity Investments (n.d.). Sectors & Industries Overview. Retrieved from
https://eresearch.fidelity.com/eresearch/markets_sectors/sectors/sectors_in_market.j
html
Fink, L. (2018, January). Larry Fink’s Annual Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose.
Retrieved from https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-finkceo-letter
Friede, G., Busch, T., & Bassen, A. (2015). ESG and financial performance: aggregated
evidence from more than 2000 empirical studies. Journal of Sustainable Finance &
Investment, 5(4), 210–233.
Hunnicutt, T. (2017, February). Index funds to surpass active fund assets in U.S. by 2024:
Moody’s. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-fundspassive/index-funds-to-surpass-active-fund-assets-in-u-s-by-2024-moodysidUSKBN15H1PN
Jackson, Jr., R. (2018, February). Perpetual Dual-Class Stock: The Case Against
Corporate Royalty. Speech, San Francisco, California. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/perpetual-dual-class-stock-case-against-corporateroyalty

39

Kapadia, R. (2017, July). Passive Investors Are the New Shareholder Activists. Barron’s.
Retrieved from https://www.barrons.com/articles/passive-investors-are-the-newshareholder-activists-1499491673
Kerber, R. (2018, April). BlackRock to offer gun-free investment strategies, ETFs.
Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-gunsblackrock/blackrock-to-offer-gun-free-investment-strategies-etfsidUSKCN1HC21M
Marriage, M., & Pooley, C. (2017, February). Passive to overtake active in US by 2024,
says Moody’s. Financial Times. Retrieved from
https://www.ft.com/content/856a0372-e897-11e6-893c-082c54a7f539
Mercado, S. (n.d.). A Stock Picker’s Guide to ETFs (Market Research). Retrieved from
https://etf.dws.com/GBR/ENG/Download/Research-USA/d29bbc8d-289d-48ac83e0-2f17c1f15771/Special-ETF-Research.pdf
MSCI ESG Research (2017, July). MSCI Global Environment Index Methodology.
Retrieved from
https://www.msci.com/eqb/methodology/meth_docs/MSCI_Global_Environment_In
dex_July2017.pdf
MSCI ESG Research (n.d.). MSCI ESG Ratings. MSCI ESG Research. Retrieved from
https://www.msci.com/documents/1296102/1636401/MSCI+ESG+Rating+Brochure
-V3.pdf/f2b4a27a-58f5-42c7-880b-cf8201039eaa
Nareit (n.d.). How to Form a REIT. (2018). Retrieved from https://www.reit.com/whatreit/how-form-reit
Peiró, A. (2016). Stock prices and macroeconomic factors: Some European evidence.
International Review of Economics & Finance, 41, 287–294.
Qin, N., & Singal, V. (2015). Indexing and Stock Price Efficiency. Financial
Management, 44(4), 875–904.
Rutherford, A., & Martin, D. (2013). Governance trends and practices at US companies:
a review of small- and mid-sized companies. Ernst & Young Corporate Governance
Center. Retrieved from
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Governance_trends_practices_at_US_c
ompanies/$FILE/Governance_trends_practices_at_US_companies.pdf
Shah, A., & Sengupta, S. (n.d.). A Study on Financial Performance and Valuation
Metrics: Application of EVA, MVA, CVA and TSR Techniques. Presented at the
Twelfth AIMS International Conference on Management, IES Management College
and Research Centre. Retrieved from
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/9647/b12799a2a585486066aca34efa7519f741b8.pd
f

40

Sharif, T., Purohit, H., & Pillai, R. (2015). Analysis of Factors Affecting Share Prices:
The Case of Bahrain Stock Exchange. International Journal of Economics and
Finance, 7(3). Retrieved from
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/31d5/8c216414658d0a76ee16e693daf25a7a73aa.pd
f
The Pennsylvania State University. (n.d.). Lesson 12: Multicollinearity & Other
Regression Pitfalls. Retrieved from
https://onlinecourses.science.psu.edu/stat501/node/347
Vlastelica, R. (2017, December). Active fund managers performed well in 2017, but
found few takers. MarketWatch. Retrieved from
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/active-fund-managers-performed-well-in-2017but-found-few-takers-2017-12-12
Weil, D. (2018, March). Passive Investors, Don’t Vote. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved
from https://www.wsj.com/articles/passive-investors-dont-vote-1520552657

41

APPENDIX A: A chart of investment constituents.

42

AUTHOR’S BIOGRAPHY

Abigail Bennett grew up in Oxford, Maine with her parents, brother, and pets of
all shapes and sizes. She will graduate from the University of Maine in 2018 as a
Financial Economics major.
She has worked for over a year as Executive Assistant at ValueEdge Advisors, a
firm that convenes dialogue between institutional owners and corporations, and develops
remedies to repair corporate governance of companies in the settlement of securities
litigation.
She is politically involved as the Secretary of the College Republican National
Committee, has interned for Senator Collins and Governor LePage, and has volunteered
on many campaigns.
On campus, she is Co-President of the Student Portfolio Investment Fund, a $3
million fund managed and invested by students, a member of the All Maine Women
honor society, an Ambassador of the School of Economics, and Historian of the Class of
2018.
After graduation, Abigail hopes to start her career in corporate governance.

43

